In this paper we take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist (VC), and study the optimal size of a VC's portfolio. We show that portfolio size and scope a¤ect the incentives of both entrepreneurs to exert e¤ort and VCs to make start-up speci…c investment. A small portfolio improves entrepreneurial incentives because it allows the VC to concentrate his limited human capital on a smaller number of start-ups, adding more value to each start-up. In addition, by holding a small portfolio, the VC commits not to extract higher rents from the entrepreneurs, with a positive impact on their incentives. A large and focused portfolio is bene…cial for the VC because it allows the VC to reallocate his limited resources and human capital from one start-up to another in case of a startup failure. Furthermore, a large and focused portfolio allows the VC to extract greater rents from the start-ups because the VC can induce competition for his limited resources. We show that the VC …nds it optimal to limit his portfolio size when start-ups have higher quality prospects ex ante, that is, when providing strong entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable. The VC expands his portfolio size only when start-up fundamentals are more moderate and only when he can form a su¢ ciently focused portfolio.
Introduction
Existing theoretical work on venture capital (VC) has so far concentrated on a VC's investment in a single entrepreneurial start-up, where the VC provides monetary and non-monetary resources to turn the entrepreneur's project idea into a viable business. 1 However, VC funds typically invest in more than one start-up at any given time, and engage in active portfolio management to maximize the return from their investment. In recent research, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) …nd substantial heterogeneity in performance across private equity funds of di¤erent size, and suggest that VCs with superior skills and greater human capital can generate better results in their investments. They also …nd that better performing VC funds grow proportionally slower and argue that better VCs may choose to stay small (by deliberately limiting the amount of capital raised) to avoid dilution from allocating their limited amount of human capital over a large number of start-ups. 2 In this paper we take a portfolio approach to analyze the investment strategy of a venture capitalist and investigate the optimal size of a VC's portfolio. More speci…cally, we address the following questions:
What determines the size of a VC's portfolio? What are the bene…ts and costs of having a small versus a large portfolio? What are the strategic aspects of managing a portfolio of start-ups? Do VCs prefer having a diversi…ed portfolio as opposed to a focused one? How do size and focus of a VC's portfolio a¤ect performance?
Our analysis shows that holding a small portfolio can be an optimal strategy for a VC even if the VC has access to a large number of potentially pro…table start-ups in the economy. Our starting point is to recognize that VC human capital is a scarce resource in the economy which cannot be augmented easily.
Even if the VC has the ability to raise unlimited amount of capital for a large number of start-ups, this may not be the optimal strategy if the VC cannot back up his monetary investment by his human capital.
Spreading his human capital and diluting his value adding capability over a large number of start-ups may a¤ect performance so adversely that the VC may …nd it optimal to limit the size of his portfolio.
Our analysis starts with the notion that both entrepreneurial e¤ort and VC human capital are essential inputs for a given start-up's success. In addition, a key feature of our analysis is to recognize that VC 1 Inderst, Mueller and Muennich (2006), Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) and Bernile and Lyandres (2003) provide notable exceptions. 2 For anecdotal evidence on the relevance of fund size see The Economist, which wrote on April 2, 2005 that "some venture capital funds say they have turned away money from investors in order to keep fund sizes down to an amount that can be managed responsibly".
human capital is a …xed resource in limited supply, and cannot be expanded easily. The basic trade-o¤ we investigate is that whether a given VC should concentrate all his human capital and resources on a small number of start-ups, or spread them over a larger number of start-ups.
We show that the size and scope of the VC's portfolio a¤ect both entrepreneurial incentives to exert e¤ort and the VC's incentives to make start-up speci…c investment. A small portfolio is bene…cial for the VC for two di¤erent reasons. The …rst is that in a smaller portfolio the VC can add more value to each start-up and, as a response, each entrepreneur …nds it optimal to exert higher e¤ort, improving success potential of the start-up. The second bene…t of a small portfolio is that by investing in a small number of start-ups, the VC limits his ability to induce competition among start-ups for his limited human capital and resources. In other words, by holding a small portfolio, the VC commits not to exploit the entrepreneurs by threatening to take resources away from one start-up and transferring them to another one. This commitment proves bene…cial for ex-ante entrepreneurial incentives.
There are bene…ts associated with holding a large portfolio as well. The …rst is that having a larger number of start-ups increases the VC's ex-post bargaining advantage when the start-ups compete for his limited human capital at a future project's stage. Thus, increasing the number of start-ups in the portfolio allows the VC to extract a higher surplus from each entrepreneur. The second bene…t of a large portfolio is that it allows the VC to reallocate resources from one start-up to another in case one start-up fails. We show that the magnitude of both bene…ts associated with a large portfolio becomes greater as the relatedness of the start-ups in the portfolio increases, that it, as the VC's ability to form a focused portfolio increases. This follows from the fact that a more focused portfolio increases both the VC's rent extraction ability and his resource reallocation e¢ ciency.
Our main results hinge on the balance between the bene…ts and the costs of a small versus large portfolio and the VC's ability to form a focused portfolio. We …nd that a small portfolio is more desirable when start-ups have a higher potential payo¤, lower risk and a lower level of relatedness. These are exactly the conditions under which promoting strong entrepreneurial incentives outweighs the cost of a reduction in the VC's rent extraction ability and resource reallocation e¢ ciency. In contrast, when start-ups have a lower expected return, higher risk and higher degree of relatedness, it becomes more desirable for the VC to form a larger portfolio. Note that a larger portfolio weakens entrepreneurial incentives, but this proves to be less costly for start-ups with lower expected returns and higher risks, since entrepreneurial e¤ort will be lower in such start-ups even in a small portfolio.
Our model also highlights the value of active portfolio management, a common VC practice observed in real life. We show that a VC with a large portfolio may …nd it optimal to divest one of his start-ups early, even if the company's early stage performance is positive. Early disposal of a start-up may result in the early termination of an otherwise potentially viable venture, or in its sale to another VC fund, or in an early Initial Public O¤er (IPO). This portfolio management strategy is desirable from the VC's point of view, since divesting a start-up allows the VC to add more value to the remaining start-ups in his portfolio and to extract more surplus from them. We …nd that the strategy of early divestiture is optimal when the start-ups in the portfolio have a high degree of relatedness and hence, when the VC has a focused portfolio. We also show that the practice of portfolio management can increase ex ante social welfare by enlarging the set of start-ups …nanced by the VC.
Our paper makes several novel contributions. This is the …rst paper, to our knowledge, which studies the interaction of size and scope of a VC's portfolio. We analyze the costs and bene…ts of a large versus small portfolio as well a focused versus a diversi…ed portfolio. Our paper shows that a VC may prefer to limit the size of his portfolio even if he has access to a large number of potentially pro…table start-ups.
Note that the VC's desire to limit portfolio size is not the outcome of the assumption that the number of good projects is limited, but it derives from the bene…t of providing entrepreneurs with stronger incentives.
In our model the VC may prefer to limit his portfolio size precisely because expanding portfolio size will have a negative spillover e¤ect on the existing investments. 3 Furthermore, we show that the VC will …nd it desirable to have larger portfolios only when he can form a portfolio of su¢ ciently related start-ups, that is, when he can e¢ ciently reallocate resources from one start-up to another. Since the ability to reallocate resources proves to be most valuable for start-ups with high risk and failure rates, this implies that VCs investing in high-tech and risky industries will be more likely to have larger portfolios.
Note that the contribution of our paper is not limited to VC investment only. Our paper also speaks to the more general topic of the theory of the …rm by studying both project size and scope together and adds to the literature on the theory of the …rm in terms of the optimal number of divisions as well as their relatedness in a given …rm. Existing research on the theory of the …rm and internal capital markets considers the advantages and disadvantages of …rms with a large number of divisions (see, for example, Gertner, Scharftein and Stein, 1994), but is silent about the relatedness of divisions within a …rm and its impact on optimal …rm size .
In an extension of our model, we analyze how changes in the supply of VCs relative to the supply of entrepreneurial ideas a¤ect optimal portfolio size. We show that an increase in the availability of VCs, keeping all else constant, leads to a reduction in the optimal portfolio size and an improvement in startup success. Similarly, an increase in the supply of entrepreneurial projects in the economy results in an increase in the optimal portfolio size.
Our work is related to several papers in the recent literature. In a recent paper, Inderst, Mueller, and
Muennich (2006) show that VCs may bene…t from limiting the amount of capital they raise by having "shallow pockets,"since competition for limited funds provides entrepreneurs with stronger incentives, even if it allows the VC to extract more surplus. Similarly, in our paper competition between entrepreneurs for the VC's resources (i.e., his human capital) allows the VC to extract more surplus from his start-ups.
However, in our paper, in contrast to Inderst, Mueller and Muennich (2006), competition for the VC's human capital and the VC's ability to extract more rents a¤ects entrepreneurs'incentives negatively. By holding a small portfolio, the VC limits the extent of competition between start-ups and commits to extract lower rents from entrepreneurs, with a positive impact on entrepreneurial incentives. Most importantly, the main objective of our paper is to investigate the size and focus of a VC's portfolio. Inderst, Mueller, and Muennich (2006) abstract from determining the optimal size of the VC's portfolio by assuming a …xed number of start-ups and do not consider the bene…ts and costs of having a focused portfolio, a key novel feature of our model.
Our paper is also related to the work by Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) , further extended by Bernile and Lyandres (2003) . In these papers a VC has limited resources that he can devote to his start-ups, and adding an additional start-up to the portfolio always weakens both the VC's and the entrepreneurs'incentives. In our model, adding a new start-up induces competition among start-ups and allows the VC to extract more surplus at the bargaining stage. However, in our paper, despite the VC's higher rent extraction ability, a large portfolio may result in stronger incentives and be bene…cial for both the entrepreneurs and the VC. This result arises due to the complementarity between entrepreneurial e¤ort and VC's investment incentives. In addition, in our paper, the VC's ability to extract surplus depends on the degree of relatedness of the start-ups, and thus portfolio focus. Di¤erently from Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) and Bernile and Lyandres (2003) we derive the optimal size of a VC's portfolio by analyzing the combined impact of portfolio size and focus on incentives.
Our work also contributes to the literature stressing the active role of VCs in adding value to their start-ups, such as Casamatta (2003), Michelacci and Suarez (2004) , and Repullo and Suarez (2004) , among others. The main di¤erence of our paper from this literature is that these papers consider the incentive problems between a single VC and a single entrepreneur while in our paper we analyze the VC's optimal investment strategy at a portfolio level.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our basic model. In Section 3.1, we examine the case where the VC has only one start-up. In Section 3.2, we study the case where the VC has two start-ups. In Section 3.3, we determine the optimal portfolio size and derive the comparative static results of the model. In Section 4, we discuss the case in which the VC engages in active portfolio management by divesting one of his start-ups early. Section 5 presents several extensions of our model and discuss the robustness of our results. Section 6 provides the empirical implications of our model. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
We consider an economy endowed with two types of risk neutral agents: venture capitalists (VCs) and wealth-constrained entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are endowed with a project idea which can be turned, with the collaboration of a VC, into a …nal marketable product. VCs provide capital as well as other value adding activities for turning entrepreneurs' ideas into viable businesses. We assume initially that the VC human capital is a scarce resource in the economy, and that VCs have access to a large supply of entrepreneurs with project ideas. This assumption re ‡ects the notion that it takes time and experience to accumulate skills and human capital to become a VC. 4 In section 5, we relax this assumption and study the impact of VC competition for entrepreneurial start-ups on optimal portfolio size.
Entrepreneurs' project ideas can be turned into a …nal product in two stages. The outcome of the …rst stage is either a success or a failure. If the …rst stage is successful, then the project is developed and commercialized during its second stage. If it is a failure, it has no value and is abandoned.
There are four dates in our economy, with no discounting between the dates. At t = 0, the VC chooses the number of start-ups to invest in his portfolio. He may invest in either one or two start-ups, or he may decide to make no investment; thus, 2 f0; 1; 2g. The development of each start-up requires the active involvement of both the VC and the entrepreneur. At t = 1; the VC makes a non-contractible start-up speci…c investment at a personal …xed cost of c, with c > 0. The VC's investment can be interpreted as the e¤ort of acquiring all the project-speci…c skills and human capital that add value to the start-up, including, for example, learning about the start-up's technology and its business opportunities, and developing all the skills useful in managing the start-up. 5 For short, we will refer to these e¤orts as the VC's start-up speci…c investment. We assume that the VC's initial human capital investment with one or two start-ups has the same cost c: This assumption captures the notion that the VC has only limited time and resources at his disposal, and that he cannot expand his investment proportionally when he has two start-ups in his portfolio rather than only one. Thus, given limited resources, the VC can either concentrate all his resources and human capital on only one start-up, or spread his resources and human capital over two start-ups, incurring the same cost c in each case.
The VC's start-up speci…c investment increases the value of the project, and each start-up will have a higher value with the VC's investment than without it. For simplicity, we normalize the start-up payo¤ to zero if the VC does not make the initial start-up speci…c investment. Note that this is not a critical assumption. All we need for our results to hold is that the potential payo¤ from a given start-up is higher with the VC's investment than without it. Thus, the VC's investment and entrepreneurial e¤ort are both necessary and complementary inputs for the success of each start-up.
Entrepreneurs play a key role during both the …rst and the second stage of their project. At t = 1;
after observing the number of start-ups the VC invests in his portfolio, each entrepreneur exerts e¤ort p;
at a cost of k 2 p 2 . 6 The parameter k measures the cost of exerting e¤ort, with k > 1: Entrepreneurial e¤ort determines the success probability of the …rst stage of the project, which becomes known at t = 2.
If the …rst stage of a given project is a failure, the start-up is terminated and both the VC and the entrepreneur obtain zero payo¤s. If the …rst stage is a success, the second stage needs the active participation of both the VC and the entrepreneur. If either the entrepreneur or the VC does not participate to the second stage, the project is divested. For simplicity, we normalize the project's payo¤ to zero when divested. We relax this assumption in Section 5, where we allow the entrepreneur to switch to a new VC and to continue the start-up without the original VC. 5 Thus, in our setting, the start-up speci…c investment represents all the non-contractible VC activities that add value to a venture. For notational simplicity, we do not explicitly consider the VC's monetary investment into the start-ups. However, our analysis could easily be modi…ed to incorporate explicitly an initial contractible monetary outlay for each project. 6 Note also that, while entrepreneurial e¤ort p is modelled as a continuous variable, with p 2 [0; 1], the VC's input is a binary choice between making the initial investment, and thus paying the cost c, or not. We make these assumptions for simplicity, since modelling the VC's investment as a continuous variable as well considerably reduces the analytical tractability of the model.
We assume that contracts are incomplete in that it is not possible to contract ex-ante on the participation of either the entrepreneur or the VC to the second stage of the project. This assumption implies that both the VC and the entrepreneur can withdraw at will their involvement and human capital from the project at the second stage. Note that this assumption is plausible particularly in the context of VC investment. Neither the VC nor the entrepreneur(s) can commit ex-ante to the continuation of the project during its second stage. VCs very often …nance entrepreneurial projects surrounded by great uncertainty.
Not only it is very di¢ cult to describe the …nal outcome of the project ex-ante, but also it is very often impossible to contract ex-ante on the level of VC's and entrepreneurs'involvement, the amount of human capital and resources to be allocated to the project, and the contingencies (such as the state and progress of the project) under which resources will be available to the start-ups in the future. Entrepreneurs'and the VC's ability to withdraw their human capital from the project implies that it is not possible to contract on the division of the total surplus between the VC and the entrepreneurs at t = 0; and that surplus allocation is determined at the interim stage, at t = 2, through bargaining. It also implies that contracts written ex-ante between the VC and the entrepreneur(s) on how to share the …nal surplus, such as equity contracts (or options, as in Noldeke and Schmidt, 1998), are ine¤ective since both the entrepreneur and the VC can (unilaterally) withdraw their participation and human capital from the implementation phase of the project. 8 Even if the VC and the entrepreneur wrote, at the outset of the venture, a sharing rule on the …nal payo¤ of the start-up, the inability to contract ex-ante on the participation of the entrepreneur and the VC to the second stage of the project implies that any preexisting sharing rule can be renegotiated away, and the division of the surplus is determined entirely by interim bargaining.
Thus, conditional on observing a successful outcome for the …rst stage of the project at t = 2; the VC and the entrepreneur(s) bargain over their compensation for the continuation of the start-up. For simplicity, we assume that the VC and the entrepreneur(s) have equal bargaining power. 9 The outcome of the bargaining process determines the allocation of the surplus between the VC and the entrepreneur, 7 Thus, contracts are incomplete in the sense of Hart and Moore (1990) and Grossman and Hart (1986) . We recognize that contracts are a very important aspect of venture capital …nancing in real life. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) document that VCs indeed use complex contracts designed to mitigate adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-up problems. The main assumption of our paper is that, after all these contractual features are accounted for, VC contracts contain a signi…cant degree of residual incompleteness and therefore are subject to renegotiation. 8 For further discussion of this point, see Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and (1996b). 9 The more general case where the VC and the entrepreneur have di¤erent bargaining power is available at request from the authors.
and thus a¤ects their incentives.
At t = 3, the payo¤ from the project is realized and distributed between the VC and the entrepreneur(s).
The payo¤ depends on the number of start-ups in the VC's portfolio. If the VC invests in only one start-up and concentrates all his initial investment on one start-up only, the payo¤ from the start-up, if successful in the …rst stage and continued during its second stage, is 2 : If the VC invests in two start-ups and allocates his initial investment between the two start-ups, each start-up, if successful in the …rst stage and continued into its second stage, generates a payo¤ of . Note that this feature is an implication of our earlier assumption that, if the VC chooses one start-up, he can specialize all his initial investment on one start-up only, and as a result, the start-up will have a higher payo¤ than in the case if the VC allocates his initial investment over two start-ups. Since the cost of initial investment, c, is the same whether the VC invests in one or two start-ups, this assumption implies that the VC can obtain the same total potential payo¤ from his portfolio, which is then divided among the number of start-ups in the portfolio.
This "linear" payo¤ structure implies that none of our results are driven by the presence of economies or diseconomies of scale in the VC's "production technology."
If one of the start-ups fails in its …rst stage, the VC can concentrate all his resources and human capital exclusively on the successful start-up, obtaining a payo¤ equal to (1 + ) ; with 0 1. The value of the parameter depends on the ability of the VC to transfer the start-up speci…c investment that he has made from one start-up to the other. Thus, depends on the degree of relatedness of the two start-ups, and we interpret it as representing the degree of "focus", or scope of the VC's portfolio.
Analysis

The VC invests in one start-up
Proceeding backward, we …rst characterize the surplus allocation between the VC and the entrepreneur through interim bargaining. When the VC invests in only one start-up, = 1, we model the bargaining game between the entrepreneur and the VC as a standard alternating-o¤ers game where, if bargaining breaks down, both the VC and the entrepreneur receive their outside options, which we normalize to zero. 10 With equal bargaining power, the VC and the entrepreneur share equally the surplus, 2 , that they jointly generate and each obtains a payo¤ . Thus, the entrepreneur determines her level of e¤ort p 1 0 See, for example, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinski (1986).
Correspondingly, the VC's expected pro…t
Proposition 1 If the VC makes the start-up speci…c investment at t = 1, the optimal level of e¤ ort exerted by the entrepreneur, p 1 , is
The corresponding level of expected pro…ts for the VC and the entrepreneur are
The VC has an incentive to make the start-up speci…c investment only if he expects a positive expected pro…t. The following lemma characterizes the VC's investment decision.
Lemma 1 The VC makes the start-up speci…c investment if and only if
If the VC does not make the investment at t = 1 (that is, if < m ), the payo¤ from the project is zero, the entrepreneur does not exert any e¤ort, and both parties obtain zero pro…ts.
The VC invests in two start-ups
We proceed again backward, and …rst characterize the outcome of the interim bargaining game between the VC and the two entrepreneurs. When the VC invests in two start-ups, = 2, the bargaining process between the VC and the entrepreneurs depends on whether only one or both projects have a successful outcome at their …rst stage, t = 2: There are three di¤erent possible cases (states of the world): (i) both projects are successful in their …rst stage, state SS; (ii) one project is successful while the other one is a failure, state SF; 11 (iii) both projects are a failure, state F F .
We begin our analysis with the (simpler) case where only one start-up, say start-up i, is successful, state SF . In this case, the VC can reallocate his human capital and concentrate exclusively on start-up i, increasing its payo¤ from to (1 + ) . Since the VC has only one successful start-up in his portfolio, the entrepreneur and the VC engage in bargaining with alternating o¤ers (with no outside options) as in the previous section. Thus, the VC's and the entrepreneurs'payo¤s, denoted respectively by l
If both start-ups are successful at t = 2, state SS, the VC bargains with both entrepreneurs. We model this process of "multilateral"bargaining between the VC and the two entrepreneurs as in Stole and Zwiebel 
where
represents the VC's outside option when bargaining with entrepreneur j. Solving the above system of equations, we obtain
By examining the VC's payo¤ in the SS state (7), it is easy to see that when the VC has two successful start-ups in his portfolio he obtains a greater fraction of the total surplus than when he has only one successful start-up, that is,
12 This happens because having a second successful start-up in his portfolio gives the VC an outside option while bargaining with each entrepreneur. Hence, the presence of a second start-up and the ability to transfer resources from one start-up to the other creates "competition" between entrepreneurs, allowing the VC to extract more surplus. The VC's ability to transfer ex-post resources from one start-up to another is critical, since when = 0 the VC extracts the same fraction of the surplus with both one and two start-ups. Note also that the VC's surplus, l
is increasing in the degree portfolio focus, whereas each entrepreneur's surplus, l 2 Ei (SS), is decreasing in the level of portfolio focus, . Thus, a greater level of portfolio focus bene…ts the VC but hurts the entrepreneurs at the bargaining stage. This happens because a greater level of focus leads to a greater outside option for the VC while he bargains with each entrepreneur, allowing the VC to extract a greater fraction of the total surplus. Note however that, as we will show below, the entrepreneurs will bene…t ex-ante from a greater degree of focus.
Finally, if both entrepreneurs fail in the …rst stage, state F F , both start-ups are terminated and all agents obtain zero payo¤s.
We now characterize the entrepreneurs' choice of e¤ort. If the VC makes the speci…c investment for each start-up, anticipating her payo¤s in di¤erent states of the world, entrepreneur i determines her e¤ort level by maximizing her expected pro…t
Similarly, the VC's expected pro…t
The …rst-order condition of (8) is
Note that the e¤ort exerted by entrepreneur i decreases in the e¤ort exerted by entrepreneur j and hence, the e¤ort levels are strategic substitutes. This happens because, when the VC has two start-ups in his portfolio, in state SS he extracts a higher surplus from each entrepreneur, reducing their expected pro…ts and their incentives to exert e¤ort. 1 2 Note also that the payo¤s in (7) are the same as the players'Shapley value of the corresponding cooperative game.
Proposition 2 If the VC makes start-up speci…c investment for each start-up at t = 1, the Nashequilibrium level of e¤ ort, denoted by p 2 , is
The corresponding level of expected pro…ts for the VC and the entrepreneurs are
It is easy to verify that the equilibrium level of entrepreneurial e¤ort p 2 , is increasing in the degree of portfolio focus, . The focus parameter has two opposing e¤ects on the level of e¤ort chosen by the entrepreneur. On the one hand, a higher degree of focus allows the VC to extract more surplus from each entrepreneur in the SS state, with a negative e¤ect on entrepreneurial e¤ort. On the other hand, a more focused portfolio allows the VC to reallocate more e¢ ciently his resources to the successful start-up in the SF state, where only one of the start-ups is successful in its …rst stage, with a positive e¤ect on entrepreneurial e¤ort. As it turns out, the second e¤ect dominates the …rst e¤ect and the overall impact of an increase in focus on the level of e¤ort and the expected pro…ts is always positive.
Entrepreneurial incentives to exert e¤ort and, in turn, the VC's investment incentives depend on the number of start-ups in the VC's portfolio. An important question is whether the entrepreneurs have stronger incentives to exert e¤ort when the VC has one or two start-ups in his portfolio.
Lemma 2 If the VC is induced to make the necessary start-up speci…c investment with both one and two start-ups in his portfolio, each entrepreneur always has greater incentives to exert e¤ ort when his start-up is the only start-up in the VC's portfolio:
Furthermore, the di¤ erence between the levels of e¤ ort, p 1 p 2 , increases in project payo¤ , , and decreases in the degree of focus, , and in the entrepreneur's cost of exerting e¤ ort, k.
If the VC makes the start-up speci…c investment, entrepreneurial incentives to exert e¤ort are always lower when the VC has two start-ups rather than when he has only one. This is due to the fact that, with two start-ups in his portfolio, the VC adds less value to each start-up and is able to extract more surplus from the entrepreneurs. Thus, conditional on the VC making the start-up speci…c investments, entrepreneurial incentives are always worse when the start-ups belong to a large portfolio, leading to a lower level of e¤ort. 13 The di¤erence between the level of e¤ort in the two cases is increasing in the project payo¤, . This property is due to the fact that when the VC has two start-ups each entrepreneur bene…ts less from an increase in the project payo¤ since the VC can extract a greater fraction of the incremental surplus from the entrepreneurs. The di¤erence between the level of e¤ort in a small and large portfolio is decreasing in the level of focus, . This can be seen by noting that an increase in the degree of focus, , increases p 2 while it has no e¤ect on p 1 , reducing the di¤erence between the two e¤ort levels. Finally, an increase in the cost of e¤ort, k, always reduces entrepreneurial e¤ort, but relatively more when the VC has only one start-up.
It is important to note that, due to the complementarity between entrepreneurial e¤ort and the VC's investment, it is possible that each entrepreneur exerts greater e¤ort when the VC has a large portfolio rather than a small one, despite the fact that they obtain lower rents in a larger portfolio. This is because, under some conditions, the VC has incentives to make the start-up speci…c investment only when he holds a large portfolio, leading the entrepreneurs to exert e¤ort as well. More speci…cally, this possibility arises when the VC's expected pro…t from investing in a single start-up is negative, while his expected pro…t from investing in two start-ups is positive. In this case, the VC can recover his initial cost c only if he holds a large portfolio. Hence, the VC will be willing to incur the cost of his initial investment and the entrepreneurs will exert e¤ort only if the VC invests in two start-ups. We will elaborate on this possibility in more detail in the next section.
Optimal portfolio size
The VC chooses his portfolio size as a result of the interaction of three distinct e¤ects and their impact on incentives. The …rst one is the rent extraction e¤ect: the VC can extract greater rents when he has a larger portfolio. This e¤ect always induces the VC to prefer (all else equal) a larger portfolio. The second e¤ect is the resource allocation e¤ect: by investing in two, rather than only one start-up, the VC can reallocate ex-post his resources and human capital from one start-up to the other. The strength of this e¤ect depends on the degree of focus of the portfolio, . If the success probability of each start-up is …xed and the same 1 3 Note that each entrepreneur has an incentive to exert e¤ort only if she expects the VC to make the start-up speci…c investment. In turn, the VC is willing to make the start-up speci…c investments only if he expects a positive pro…t, net of his total investment cost c:
regardless of whether the VC has one or two start-ups, this e¤ect always leads the VC to prefer a large portfolio to a small one. 14 The third e¤ect is the value dilution e¤ect: a larger portfolio requires the VC to spread his …xed amount of resources and human capital over a larger number of start-ups. The result is that the VC adds lower value to each start-up: he will add only to each start-up in the SS state, and
(1 + ) in the SF state. Thus, the value dilution e¤ect favors a small portfolio.
Portfolio size a¤ects the VC's and the entrepreneurs'incentives as follows. First, in a large portfolio, the rent extraction e¤ect favors the VC and, thus, impacts entrepreneurial incentives negatively and the VC's investment incentives positively. Second, a large portfolio allows the VC to reallocate his human capital from one start-up to another in case one of the start-ups fails; this possibility bene…ts both the entrepreneurs and the VC and, thus, a¤ects their incentives positively. Furthermore, this e¤ect is stronger when the level of the portfolio focus is higher. Third, in a large portfolio, dilution from spreading the VC's resources and human capital over two start-ups lowers the payo¤ from exerting e¤ort, and thus reduces both entrepreneurial e¤ort and the VC's investment incentives.
The VC's optimal portfolio size depends on the value of the project payo¤, , and portfolio focus, , which may fall in one of three possible regions (see Figure 1 ): the VC can invest in no start-up at all (Region 0), in one start-up (Region 1), or in two start-ups (Region 2), as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There are critical values f c ; 1 ( ; k); 2 ( ; k)g (de…ned in the appendix) such that the VC's optimal portfolio size is as follows: i) for low project payo¤ (0 < 1 ) the VC invests in no start-up, = 0 (Region 0);
ii) for high project payo¤ ( 2 ) the VC invests in one start-up only, = 1 (Region 1);
iii) for moderate project payo¤ and high focus ( 1 < 2 and c 1) the VC invests in two start-ups, = 2 (Region 2).
Furthermore,
0, and
1 4 This property can be seen as follows. If the VC has only one start-up, and the entrepreneur exerts e¤ort p, total expected value of the VC's portfolio is p2 : If the VC has two start-ups in his portfolio, and each entrepreneur exerts e¤ort q, the total expected value of the VC's portfolio is 2q 2 + 2q(1 q)(1 + ) = 2q + 2q(1 q) . It is easy to see that the expected value of the VC's portfolio is larger with two start-ups than with only one when
; which is always the case when p = q and > 0. Note, however, that in our analysis, p and q are determined endogenously as a function of portfolio size and focus.
Two key insights emerge from Proposition 3. The …rst is that the VC …nds it optimal to hold a small portfolio when the project payo¤, , is relatively high, that is, when 2 (Region 1). In this region, the bene…ts of a small portfolio in terms of better entrepreneurial incentives dominate the advantages of a large portfolio in terms of rent extraction and resource reallocation. The intuition for this result is as follows. From Lemma 2, we know that the di¤erence in the entrepreneurs' e¤ort levels in a small and a large portfolio, that is, p 1 p 2 , is greater when project payo¤ is larger. This implies that the negative impact on entrepreneurial incentives of holding a large portfolio is greater at higher values of . The proposition shows that, for start-ups with a large , the VC prefers to give up the greater rent extraction ability and the resource allocation advantages of a large portfolio for the bene…ts of stronger entrepreneurial incentives of a small portfolio.
Note that the parameter can be interpreted as representing the project's residual expected value, after the …rst stage is completed. Thus, a greater value of characterizes start-ups with either larger ultimate payo¤, or with greater ultimate success probability. In other words, greater values of represent start-ups with stronger ex-ante fundamentals. Proposition 3, therefore, implies that the VC …nds it optimal to have a smaller portfolio when he has access to start-ups with strong fundamentals. By holding a small portfolio, the VC boosts entrepreneurial incentives and increases the success probability of his start-ups.
A small size portfolio, therefore, is desirable precisely because it allows the VC to obtain superior ex-post performance from his investment.
The second insight of Proposition 3 is that the VC …nds it optimal to hold a large portfolio when the project payo¤ is moderate and when he can form a portfolio with su¢ cient focus, that is, when 1 < 2 and c 1 (Region 2). For start-ups with a more moderate potential, the bene…ts of a larger portfolio in terms of greater rent extraction and resource reallocation ability dominate the incentive advantage of a small portfolio. The intuition for this result is as follows. In this region, a large value of implies that the rent extraction and resource reallocation e¤ects of a large portfolio are signi…cant.
Furthermore the di¤erence between the levels of entrepreneurial e¤ort in a small and a large portfolio is smaller at moderate values of , as established in Lemma 2. Thus, when parameter values fall in this region, the rent extraction and resource allocation e¤ects dominate the incentive e¤ect, and the VC holds a large portfolio. This also implies that, for a given project payo¤ , the VC …nds it optimal to expand his portfolio only at su¢ ciently high values of (see again Figure 1 ). Thus, the VC is willing to increase the size of his portfolio only if he can form a portfolio with su¢ cient focus by investing in highly related startups, a property which is formally re ‡ected by the fact that
that an increase in the entrepreneurs' cost of exerting e¤ort, k, makes larger portfolios more desirable.
This happens because an increase in the value of k reduces entrepreneurial e¤ort, which leads to a lower success probability for each start-up and to a riskier portfolio. As a result, the VC's willingness to hold a larger portfolio increases since a lower success rate for each start-up increases the importance of the resource reallocation bene…t of large portfolios. This also implies VCs prefer larger and more focused portfolios for start-ups with moderate fundamentals.
Note also that for some parameter values in this region, that is, when 1 < m , the VC's expected pro…ts are positive only if he holds a large portfolio, and negative if he holds a small portfolio (that is,
. This happens because, with a small portfolio, the VC cannot extract enough rents from the entrepreneur to compensate him for the cost of making the initial investment, c. In this case,
anticipating that the VC is not willing to make the initial start-up investment, the entrepreneur does not exert e¤ort either, and the project is not undertaken even if it is potentially pro…table. Investing in a large portfolio, however, provides the VC with the rent extraction and resource reallocation bene…ts and induces him to make the required initial investment. Anticipating the improved incentives of the VC, the entrepreneurs exert e¤ort and the projects become viable. As a result, both the VC and the entrepreneurs turn out to be better o¤ when the VC holds a large portfolio.
The above result has an interesting implication that entrepreneurial ideas with a moderate value may be economically viable only if the VC can form a large portfolio with a su¢ cient degree of focus. If we interpret as measuring the size of a start-up, this implies that VCs would be willing to invest in small businesses only if they are able to combine such start-ups in a portfolio of su¢ cient size and focus. It also implies that entrepreneurs with smaller businesses will have an incentive to cluster in similar or related industries so that they can be …nanced by a common VC. Thus, small and risky businesses (characterized by small or moderate ) may be economically viable and obtain VC …nancing only if they have a su¢ cient degree of industry focus among them. A policy implication from this result is that encouraging small business creation in the same or related industries will improve available VC …nancing and enhance social welfare because potential VCs will be willing to provide monetary and human capital to such businesses only if they have a common industry focus.
Finally, when the level of is very low, that is when 0 < 1 (Region 0), the VC does not invest in any start-up. In this region the project payo¤ is so low that the VC cannot recover his initial investment cost c. As a result, the VC does not make any start-up speci…c investment and the entrepreneurs do not exert any e¤ort. Hence the project opportunities cannot be exploited.
In this section we show that the VC can increase his expected pro…ts by engaging in active portfolio management, that is, by divesting one of his successful start-ups. This strategy can be optimal since the possibility of divesting one of the start-ups allows the VC to extract more surplus from the remaining one.
Thus, this section helps shed some light on why VCs may make seemingly socially ine¢ cient decisions by terminating some of their start-ups prematurely in order to maximize their own welfare. 15 We modify our basic model as follows. Consider the case in which the VC invests in two start-ups and both entrepreneurs have a successful …rst stage, state SS. The VC now faces two choices. He can either continue both start-ups, or divest one of them and dedicate himself entirely to the remaining one. If the VC chooses not to continue a successful start-up, he can divest it, for example through a sale to another VC (or some private buyer), or even take it public in an IPO. We assume that the proceeds from divesting the start-up are lower than the proceeds from continuing with the original VC and, for simplicity, are normalized to zero. 16 The VC now has the option to bargain with one entrepreneur for the continuation of only her start-up and the termination of the other start-up, which we denote as "bilateral"bargaining.
Alternatively, the VC can engage, as before, in multilateral bargaining with both entrepreneurs for the continuation of both start-ups. This choice is important because the VC may be able to extract a di¤erent surplus depending on whether he continues one or both start-ups.
We model the process of bilateral bargaining in state SS as follows. The VC selects, with equal probability, one of the two successful start-ups, say start-up i, and negotiates with entrepreneur i the payo¤ that he will receive for his exclusive participation to the continuation of start-up i only. This may be achieved, for example, by negotiating, at the bargaining stage, an agreement between the VC and the entrepreneur that limits the VC's ability to participate in other start-ups. This implies that the VC can commit not to participate to the continuation of the other project and to divest it. The VC's ability to make such a commitment at this stage of the game (after the realization of the state of the world) is a much weaker requirement than the assumption that the VC can, at the beginning of the game, commit to continue a start-up under predetermined circumstances, a possibility that we have ruled out. 17 While 1 5 See, for example, the Economist, November 27, 2004 which reports that "Google's founders would have preferred to wait longer to do their IPO, but had to rush it because venture capitalists, including Kleiner Perkins, wanted to cash in." 1 6 Normalizing divestiture payo¤ is only a simpli…cation. Our results go through as long as divestiture payo¤ is lower than the payo¤ possible with the incumbent VC. This assumption re ‡ects that the incumbent VC, because of the initial speci…c investment he made, can generate a greater payo¤ than the divestiture payo¤. 1 7 Note that the use of such provisions is very common in stock purchase agreements. For a discussion of covenants in bargaining with entrepreneur i, the VC has the outside option to go to the start-up j and start a new round of bargaining with entrepreneur j, obtaining l j V , de…ned in (6). Both entrepreneurs have again zero outside options. This implies that the VC's and entrepreneur i's payo¤s are given by
A critical question is whether the VC can obtain a greater payo¤ by continuing both start-ups or by divesting one of them and continuing only the remaining one. This choice depends on whether the VC can extract more surplus by engaging in multilateral or bilateral bargaining with the entrepreneurs, given the structure of the bargaining games.
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Proposition 4 The VC continues only one project and divests the other if and only if When the VC divests one of the start-ups, from (14), he will receive 3 4 of the total surplus (1 + ) . When the VC continues both start-ups, from (7), he will receive a fraction 3+ 6 of the total surplus 2 . By direct comparison, it is easy to see that , the VC …nds it optimal to exploit the better bargaining position provided by bilateral bargaining, and thus prefers to continue one start-up only. When there is no value loss in reallocating resources from one start-up to the other, that is, when = 1, the VC always prefers to divest one of the two start-ups. In contrast, when the loss from divesting one project is su¢ ciently large, < , the VC will choose in the SS state to continue both start-ups, and Proposition 3 will remain valid. Thus, in the remainder of the analysis, we will assume that 3 5 and characterize the optimal portfolio size when the VC divests one of the successful start-ups in the SS state. In the SF and F F states, the game unfolds as before.
shareholders agreements, see Gompers and Lerner (1996) and Chemla, Habib and Ljungqvist (2006). 1 8 In other words, given the structure of the respective bargaining games, the VC may be willing to ine¢ ciently terminate one of the two start-ups if he cannot internalize a su¢ ciently large part of the e¢ ciency gains that can be obtained by continuing both start-ups. The question of whether the VC can internalize, through multilateral bargaining, a su¢ cient portion of the e¢ ciency gains to induce him to always make the socially e¢ cient decision is ultimately an empirical one.
Anticipating her payo¤s in di¤erent states of the world, entrepreneur i determines her level of e¤ort p i by maximizing her expected pro…t
Proposition 5 The Nash-equilibrium level of e¤ ort, denoted by p 2B ; is
The following proposition characterizes the VC's optimal portfolio size. and illustrates the e¤ect of portfolio management on the VC's portfolio size. 1 and c < c(1; k). There is a^ such that: 19 Hence, even though portfolio management results ex-post in a socially ine¢ cient termination of a start-up, it may nevertheless improve ex-ante social welfare by enlarging the set of feasible start-ups.
Proposition 6 Let
Proposition 7 Let
The above result is reversed when start-ups are only moderately related, that is, when 3 5 ^ . In this case portfolio management shrinks the region where the VC invests in two start-ups, implied by 
Extensions and robustness
In our basic model we study the static portfolio problem of a single VC facing a large supply of entrepreneurial projects. In this section we extend our model in two directions: First, we introduce VC competition for entrepreneurs and examine its e¤ect on optimal portfolio size. Competition among VCs for start-ups generates an outside option for entrepreneurs and, thus, a¤ects both entrepreneurial incentives and the optimal portfolio size. Second, we consider a dynamic, in…nite-horizon version of our basic model, where the VC can invest in new start-ups over time when a project either fails or is completed. We show that the main results of our static model carry over to these more general settings. For analytical tractability we analyze these two cases separately and, for notational simplicity, we set k = 1.
Competition for entrepreneurs
This section extends our basic model such that VCs compete for entrepreneurs …rst ex-ante, when they form their portfolios at t = 0, and then a second time in the interim, when the …rst stage of the project is completed. We modify our model as follows. First, we assume that a successful entrepreneur can, at 
If at t = 0 the VC invests in two start-ups, he will bargain again with the two entrepreneurs, each having the option to leave the original VC and switch to another VC. By modifying the multilateral bargaining game discussed in the basic model correspondingly, it is easy to show that each entrepreneur's payo¤ from bargaining in the SS state, denoted byl 
The Nash-equilibrium e¤ort level,p 2 , isp
The corresponding expected pro…ts for the VC and the entrepreneurs arẽ (1 2 ) 3))
Note that the ability to switch to a new VC allows the entrepreneurs to extract more surplus from the original VC, with a positive e¤ect on their e¤ort incentives and, thus, the success probability of the start-ups, as summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Entrepreneurial e¤ ort is strictly increasing in 1 .
In addition to ex-post competition, we assume that VCs compete for entrepreneurs ex-ante when they choose their portfolios at t = 0. Availability of other VCs is important if entrepreneurs and VCs bargain ex-ante for the division of the joint surplus. Ex-ante competition for entrepreneurs provides the entrepreneurs with an outside option which a¤ects the division of the total ex-ante expected surplus.
We further modify the basic game as follows. At the beginning of the game, t = 0, the VC selects one or two start-ups and bargain with the entrepreneur(s). Bargain results in a side payment, t, from the VC to the entrepreneur(s). We assume that t 0 since we continue to assume that the entrepreneurs are wealth constrained. Entrepreneurs have now an outside option with a value of 0 0. We interpret 0 as a measure of the scarcity of entrepreneurs relative to VCs, and therefore the tightness of the VC market. 20 The VC moves …rst and chooses whether to form a small or a large portfolio, and therefore, whether to bargain with one or two entrepreneurs. The following proposition characterizes the optimal portfolio size when the entrepreneurs have outside options both ex-ante, 0 , and in the interim, 1 .
2 0 Note that we assume that at the beginning of the game the VC and the entrepreneurs have already identi…ed each other and that the value for the entrepreneurs to search for alternative VCs is lower than the expected payo¤ they can obtain from bargaining with the present VC. This is because the search for alternative VCs is costly.
Proposition 8 There are critical values f~ c ;~ 1 ;~ 2 g (de…ned in the appendix) such that the VC's optimal portfolio size is as follows:
i) for low project payo¤ (0 <~ 1 ) the VC does not invest in any start-up, = 0;
ii) for high project payo¤ ( ~ 2 ) the VC invests in one start-up only, = 1;
iii) for moderate project payo¤ and high focus (~ 1 <~ 2 and~ c 1) the VC invests in two start-ups, = 2.
Proposition 8 shows that our earlier results hold also in the case when entrepreneurs can switch to alternative VCs both ex-ante and in the interim. At the outset of the game, the VC chooses the size of his portfolio by comparing the bene…ts of large and small portfolios identi…ed in the basic model. When start-ups have a high project payo¤, , the bene…ts of a small portfolio in terms of better entrepreneurial incentives outweigh the bene…ts of large portfolio in terms of rent extraction and resource reallocation ability. Thus, the VC optimally chooses a small portfolio and sets = 1. For moderate value of project payo¤ and high portfolio focus, the VC prefers a large portfolio and sets = 2.
The di¤erence with the basic model is that the entrepreneurs' outside option due to the availability of other VCs a¤ects the ex-ante allocation of the surplus, and the portfolio size. The ex-ante availability of alternative VCs creates competition for the VC and a¤ects him negatively by reducing his ability to extract surplus from the entrepreneurs. The magnitude of this negative e¤ect is greater (at the margin) in a large portfolio than in a small one. This happens because in a large portfolio the VC must bargain with a greater number of entrepreneurs, each of whom possesses an outside option, 0 . Thus, the availability of other VCs, or an increase in the supply of VCs relative to the supply of entrepreneurs, reduces the desirability of large portfolios. This means that VCs are more likely to choose a smaller portfolio when entrepreneurs have a greater outside option, that is, when entrepreneurs are relatively more scarce than VCs, implied by
< 0. Correspondingly, VCs are more likely to have larger portfolios when there is an increase in the supply of entrepreneurial projects, re ‡ected by a reduction in 0 :
A dynamic extension
In this section we discuss a dynamic, in…nite-horizon version of our basic model, where the VC can invest in new start-ups when the existing projects in his portfolio fail or are completed. At t = 0, the VC can invest in either one or two start-ups, or none: 0 2 f0; 1; 2g. If the VC invests in one start-up, and the start-up fails at t = 1, the VC can invest in a new start-up. Investment in a new start-up will require the VC to make a new start-up speci…c investment. For notational simplicity, we assume that the VC sustains the same cost c every time he invests in new start-ups. 21 If the start-up is successful, the VC and the entrepreneur complete the second stage of the project, as in the static model. The di¤erence from the static model is that now, while bargaining with the entrepreneur, the VC has the ability to invest in a new start-up. This ability allows the VC to extract more surplus from the entrepreneur. Letting v 1 be the VC's continuation payo¤ in the (sub)game, at the bargaining stage the VC's surplus is given bŷ
. The entrepreneur's surplus is given byl
, and she chooses her e¤ort level p to maximize her expected pro…t^
resulting inp
2 . Stationarity implies that the VC's expected pro…t from holding a small portfolio, v 1 , is implicitly de…ned by
where < 1 is the appropriate discount factor. Now consider the case where the VC invests in two start-ups at t = 0: If one of the two start-ups fails, state SF , we assume (for simplicity) that it is always optimal for the VC to reallocate his human capital to the successful start-up rather than to invest in an additional one. In this case, the VC and the entrepreneur bargain over the division of the surplus under the condition that the VC has the outside option of investing new start-ups. This implies that the VC will obtain a surplusl
to the entrepreneur. Similarly, if both start-ups are successful, state SS, the VC's bargaining with both start-ups proceeds as described in the basic model, under the assumption that if bargaining with one start-up breaks down, the VC reallocates his human capital to the remaining start-up and starts a fresh round of bargaining. Bargaining with the remaining start-up takes place again under the condition that the VC has the outside option of investing in a new round of start-ups. This implies that the VC obtains a surplus equal tol
to each entrepreneur. Finally, if both start-ups fail, state F F , the VC will invest in a new round of two start-ups.
Each entrepreneur chooses
The Nash-equilibrium e¤ortp 2 isp
Stationarity implies that the VC's expected pro…t from holding a large portfolio, v 2 , is implicitly de…ned
The following proposition characterizes the VC's optimal portfolio size. Proposition 9 shows that the main results of the static setting extend to the dynamic setting as well.
In the dynamic setting, the VC still chooses the size of his portfolio by trading o¤ the rent extraction, the resource allocation, and the value dilution e¤ect. However, the VC's ability to start new projects a¤ects the magnitude of the rent extraction and the resource reallocation e¤ects. First consider the rent extraction e¤ect. The VC's ability to start new projects gives the VC an outside option and thus increases his rent extraction ability (both in a small and a large portfolio). However, the marginal increase in his rent extraction ability is greater with a small portfolio than with a large portfolio since in the static model with a small portfolio the VC has no outside options at all. The additional rent extraction ability, however, comes at the cost of worsening entrepreneurial incentives.
Second consider the resource reallocation e¤ect which refers to the VC's ability to reallocate his human capital and resources from one start-up to another. In the static setting, this e¤ect increases the attractiveness of a large portfolio relative to a small portfolio since when the VC has only one start-up he cannot reallocate resources. In the dynamic setting, however, the ability to start new investments allows the VC to reallocate resources to new start-ups even when the VC has a small portfolio. Speci…cally, the VC cannot reallocate his resources across start-ups at a given time, but he can reallocate his resources over time to new start-ups if the current start-up in his portfolio fails or is completed. Hence, the dynamic setting increases the desirability of small portfolios relative to large portfolios, especially for start-ups with moderate fundamentals and high failure rates.
Finally, note that moving from the static to dynamic setting does not a¤ect the value dilution e¤ect in any way, and this e¤ect continues to favor small portfolios in the dynamic setting.
Since all previously identi…ed e¤ects and trade-o¤s between holding small and large portfolios survive in the dynamic setting, all our previous results go through under the dynamic speci…cation. The only di¤erence is that the dynamic setting may result in an increase or a decrease in the desirability of small portfolios relative to large portfolios depending on parameter values (that is,
2 ).
Empirical implications
The empirical predictions of our model hinge on the factors that a¤ect the value of the critical parameters in our model, especially and .
(i) VCs prefer to limit their portfolio size for start-ups with ex-ante higher quality. High quality start-ups with strong fundamentals are expected to generate greater value if successful, and therefore are characterized by a greater value of . Our model shows that the VC …nds it more desirable to limit his portfolio size for such start-ups because doing so leads to strong entrepreneurial incentives, which proves to be most desirable for start-ups with strong fundamentals. Stronger entrepreneurial incentives improve start-up success probability and, therefore, generate a superior portfolio performance and pro…ts. Thus, this prediction helps explain the …nding in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) that better performing VC funds may choose to stay small.
(ii) VCs investing in high-risk technologies manage larger and more focused portfolios. In our analysis, VCs bene…t from investing in related start-ups (high ) because focus allows a more e¢ cient reallocation of human capital from one start-up to another. Reallocation of human capital is more likely when the (endogenous) failure probability for start-ups is relatively high, which happens when is small or k is large.
A greater level of focus reduces the ex-post ine¢ ciency associated with spreading the VC's resources across several start-ups, and increases the bene…ts of ex-post resource reallocation. This implies that focused portfolios are more desirable (all else equal) for start-ups that invest in technologies with high uncertainty and failure rates. This prediction is consistent with the …ndings of Cumming (2006) . This paper documents that large portfolios are more likely to be observed for VCs investing in life sciences (rather than other high-tech …rms), and argues that this strategy emerges because there are greater complementarities (i.e., higher focus) across entrepreneurial …rms in the life sciences industry. with the most industry speci…c human capital and experience react most to an increase in investment opportunities in the sectors of their specialization. The explanation they o¤er for this evidence is that it is more di¢ cult for diversi…ed and less specialized VCs to redeploy their human capital from the sectors of their current investment to the sector experiencing an increase in investment opportunities.
(iv) An increase in the availability of VC …nancing increases entrepreneurial e¤ ort and leads to better success rates for start-ups. In Section 5.1 we show that availability of ex-post VC …nancing increases the entrepreneurs'ability to extract rents from the VC and, hence, their e¤ort. A greater level of entrepreneurial e¤ort leads to a higher success probability for start-ups. Thus, greater availability of VC …nancing, and a greater ability of entrepreneurs to transfer their start-ups to alternative VCs, are positively correlated with better success rates for start-ups. This, to our knowledge, a new and testable implication.
(v) In markets with more abundant supply of VCs (relative to entrepreneurs), VCs will hold smaller portfolios. In markets characterized by a more abundant supply of VCs, competition for start-ups allows entrepreneurs to extract greater rents from VCs. As a result, VCs'desire for larger portfolios decreases.
Hence, greater competition among VCs leads to smaller portfolios, a new empirical prediction.
(vi) Industry clustering of smaller entrepreneurial businesses will increase VCs willingness to provide …nancing to such businesses and will have a positive impact on the creation and the development of new businesses. Our analysis shows that smaller size entrepreneurial projects characterized by moderate will become …nancially viable only if the VC can combine them in his portfolio and create a positive externality between them (given by the reallocation e¤ect). Hence, for a small size start-up, existence of competing but related businesses in the same industry does not necessarily represent a threat, but rather it contributes to the development and commercialization of the business by increasing VCs'willingness to provide …nancing for it. This is a novel prediction of our model with the policy implication that encouraging small business development in similar industries or geographical locations will increase prospects of such businesses to receive VC funding.
(vii) VCs with the ability and the experience to create synergies across start-ups will hold larger portfolios. Our model establishes that VCs with a better ability at reallocating resources from one start-up to another are more willing to hold larger portfolios. One interpretation of this result is that experienced
VCs will be better at reshu-ing resources and generating synergies across start-ups and hence will have a greater willingness to hold larger portfolios.
Conclusions
This paper studies the size and focus of a VC's portfolio. We have identi…ed three main e¤ects of portfolio size on the VC's and entrepreneurs' incentives. The …rst one is the rent extraction e¤ect: The VC can extract higher rents in a larger portfolio by using his ability to reallocate his limited resources from one start-up to another. This e¤ect, everything else constant, leads to stronger incentives for the VC and weaker incentives for the entrepreneurs. The second e¤ect is the resource allocation e¤ect: The VC bene…ts from investing in a large number of start-ups because this increases (all else equal) the probability that at least one of the start-ups will be successful and thus the VC will have greater chances to earn a return from his investment. This e¤ect depends on the VC's ability to reallocate ex-post his resources from one start-up to another, after observing whether they have been successful or not. This e¤ect has a positive impact both on the VC's investment incentives and entrepreneurial incentives. The third e¤ect is the value dilution e¤ect: A larger portfolio requires the VC to spread his limited resources across a large number of start-ups, diluting his value-adding role, with a negative impact on both the VC's and entrepreneurial incentives.
Our paper has several implications for VC portfolio management. One key message is that limiting portfolio size may prove to be bene…cial for a VC despite his ability to add a large number of start-ups to his portfolio. This result originates from the fact that VC human capital is a scarce resource and committing it to a fewer number of start-ups results in stronger entrepreneurial incentives. In addition, limiting portfolio size is most desirable for start-ups with strong ex-ante fundamentals since improving entrepreneurial incentives is most valuable for such start-ups. A larger portfolio becomes optimal when start-up fundamentals become moderate and when the VC can form a focused portfolio. A high level of focus increases the bene…ts of a large portfolio in terms of the VC's rent extraction and resource reallocation ability. We also show that entrepreneurs with smaller businesses may bene…t from belonging to a large portfolio, rather than a small one, even if this means that the VC can extract more surplus from them. This happens when a large portfolio is the only way to enable the VC to make the start-up speci…c investments necessary for the success of the start-ups in his portfolio. In addition, clustering of smaller size businesses with a common industry focus increases their prospects of obtaining VC funding and proves to be bene…cial for both entrepreneurs and VCs. Finally, we show that VCs can create value by engaging in portfolio management, a real life practice employed by many VCs. Portfolio management refers to early divestitures of some start-ups to extract higher surplus from the remaining start-ups. We …nd that the VC bene…ts from portfolio management when the relatedness of the start-ups in his portfolio is high. Under certain conditions, the ability to engage in portfolio management proves to be socially e¢ cient since it enlarges the set of economically viable start-ups.
Proof of Proposition 1. The …rst order condition of (1) with respect to p is = kp, which, if solved for p, gives (3). Substituting (3) into the entrepreneur's and the VC's objective functions, given by (1) and (2) respectively, gives (4).
Proof of Lemma 1. The VC will make the investment if and only if his expected pro…ts are nonnegative. It is straightforward to see that the VC's pro…ts, given in (4), are nonnegative if and only if
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the reaction functions of the two entrepreneurs are symmetric, the Nash-equilibrium of the e¤ort choice subgame is obtained by setting p j p i in the …rst-order condition (10) , and then solving for p i ; giving (11) . Substituting the Nash-equilibrium level of e¤ort (11) into the entrepreneurs'objective function, (8) , and in the VC's objective function, (9) , gives the VC's pro…ts (12) and the entrepreneurs'pro…ts (13). 
; which is always true for 1: From (3) and (11) we have that
Di¤erentiating (30) with respect to gives that
since p 1 (1) < 1 implies that < k. Di¤erentiating (30) with respect to k yields that V to decide whether to invest in one or two start-ups. Using (4) and (12), we have that the VC invests in one start-up if and only if
Rearranging the inequality, we obtain that
V if and only if
Note that P 1 is a convex parabola in with two roots, 1 and 2 , given by It is straightforward to show that 1 < 0 for all 0 < < 1; k > 0: We also have that 2 > 0 for > c :
This can be seen by noting that at = c we have that 2 ( M ; k) = 1 ( c ; k) = m > 0 and Note that we also have shown that 
Since the reaction functions of the two entrepreneurs are symmetric, the Nash-equilibrium of the e¤ort choice subgame is obtained by setting p j = p B i in the …rst-order condition (32) and solving for p B i ; giving (18) . Substituting the Nash-equilibrium level of e¤ort (18) into the entrepreneurs'objective function (16) and VC's objective function, (17) , gives (19) and (20) .
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. From Note that P 2 is convex in , and has two roots,~ This implies that t = This implies that for~ 1 <~ 2 ( ; 0 ) the VC sets = 2, and for ~ 2 ( ; 0 ) the VC sets = 1, proving (iii) and (iv). This also implies that Proof of Proposition 9. This proof follows a procedure similar to the one used in the proof of Proposition 3. The VC will choose at each date the portfolio that maximizes his continuation payo¤ by comparing (26) and (29). By implicit function di¤erentiation of (29) it is easy to show that there is a c1 > 0 such that if c1 we have that 
